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FLAWED ECONOMIC 
ASSUMPTIONS: CRITICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 
 
Mortgage Market Reform and the 
Fallacy of Self-­Correcting Markets 
 
Robin Paul Malloy  
 
I. Introduction 
 
Markets are the product of volitional arrangements that 
incentivize particular networks and patterns of exchange.1  The 
  
   Copyright 2009 by Robin Paul Malloy.  The author and the PACE LAW 
REVIEW have full rights to this article.  Malloy is E.I. White Chair and 
Distinguished Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law;; Series 
Editor (with Blanck), DISABILITY LAW AND POLICY Book Series (Cambridge 
University Press);; Series Editor, LAW, PROPERTY AND SOCIETY Book Series 
(Ashgate Publishing);; and Series Editor (with Ghosh) LAW AND 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP Book Series (Edward Elgar Publishing).  In addition to 
numerous books and articles on law and market theory, as well as real estate 
transactions and development, he is the author, with James C. Smith, of 
REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS (2007), now in its third edition from Aspen 
Publishing.  This article was prepared for a special symposium issue of the 
PACE LAW REVIEW on Real Property, Mortgages, and the Economy: A Call for 
Ethics and Reforms.  The author is pleased to have been invited to participate 
in the live symposium held on March 20, 2009, at Pace University School of 
Law, and is happy to contribute his article to this very important issue of the 
PACE LAW REVIEW.  The author would like to thank Anthony Rapa for helpful 
research assistance in preparing notes for this article.  Some of the ideas 
addressed in this article were developed for a presentation at the University 
of Glasgow for a meeting addressing The Future of Financial Regulation and 
the author thanks participants in that meeting for their helpful comments.  A 
related but much shorter and more general discussion of some of these ideas 
will appear as a chapter in a forthcoming book from that conference, entitled 
IAIN MACNEIL & JUSTIN 2·%RIEN, THE FUTURE OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 
(forthcoming 2009). 
1. See DANIEL W. BROMLEY, SUFFICIENT REASON: VOLITIONAL PRAGMATISM 
1
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sustainability of any given set of market relationships, 
therefore, depends on the goals to be achieved and the 
appropriateness of the established incentive structure.  These 
incentivized relationships are subject to numerous influences 
and dynamics requiring careful supervision, continuous re-­
evaluation, and regularized adjustments over time.  In this 
context, the current crisis in U.S. housing and mortgage 
markets reflects poorly incentivized exchange relationships.  
The current situation cannot simply be blamed on meaningless 
PHWDSKRUVUHODWHGWREHLQJFDXJKWLQ´WKHSHUIHFWVWRUP.µ The 
crisis in the United States, which also underlies the crisis 
globally, stems from an overly optimistic view of self-­regulating 
markets and of the belief in an unregulated ´invisible hand.µ2  
  
AND THE MEANING OF ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS (2006). 
2. The reference here is to Adam Smith and his famous metaphor of the 
invisible hand.  Adam Smith mentions the idea of the invisible hand in his 
work, The Wealth of Nations and also in his earlier work on The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments.  Below are samples quotes from each book.  With respect 
to the actions of a person following his own self-­interest, Smith observed that: 
 
He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public 
interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. . . . [B]y 
directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may 
be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and 
he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible 
hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention.  
Nor is it always worse for society that it was no part of it.  
By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of 
society more effectively than when he really intends to 
promote it. 
 
1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 477-­78 (Edwin Cannon, ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1976) (1776). 
 
The rich only select from the heap what is most precious 
and agreeable. . . . [I]n spite of their natural selfishness and 
rapacity, though they mean only their own conveiniency, 
though the sole end which they propose from the labours of 
all the thousands, whom they employ, be the gratification of 
their own vain and insatiable desires, they divide with the 
poor the produce of all their improvements.  They are led by 
an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of 
the necessaries of life, which would have been made, had 
the earth been divided into equal portions among all its 
inhabitants, and thus without intending it, without knowing 
it, advance the interest of the society . . . . 
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It is not a storm caused by nature;; it is the product of human 
action and inaction resulting from a lingering belief in laissez-­
faire. 
The current situation calls for volitional and purposeful 
regulation of mortgage markets.  Simply throwing money at 
banks, lenders, and defaulting borrowers is not enough.3  There 
is a need to examine and reform current market operations.  
Significantly, it should be noted that the need for examination 
and reform is not the same as suggesting the elimination of 
secondary mortgage markets.  In fact, we need secondary 
markets for mortgages and securitization to facilitate economic 
development, risk spreading, and enhanced liquidity. 
This Article examines the mortgage market meltdown from 
the perspective of market exchange theory, or what I have 
elsewhere referred to as law and market economy.4  From this 
perspective, I examine the exchange relationships among 
primary and secondary mortgage market participants in an 
effort to identify potential problems and to offer some 
suggestions for reform. 
While there are many issues that might be addressed in 
considering all of the various elements of the U.S. mortgage 
  
ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 304 (E.G. West, ed., Liberty 
Classics 1969) (1759).  
3. We need structural change in the way in which we incentivize 
exchange relationships.  While supportive funding may be important, it must 
be accompanied with action to change the way in which exchange is taking 
place.  Reform is needed so as to improve current market operations.  See 
infra discussion Part IV (suggesting specific steps that can be taken to 
positively change the current networks and patterns of exchange in the 
primary market). 
4. See ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY: REINTERPRETING 
THE VALUES OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (2000) [hereinafter MALLOY, MARKET 
ECONOMY];; ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW IN A MARKET CONTEXT: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO MARKET CONCEPTS IN LEGAL REASONING (2004) [hereinafter 
MALLOY, MARKET CONTEXT].  A major idea expressed in each book is that 
markets are about exchange and not simply about an amoral calculus of 
choice.  It is important to understand such things as who initiates exchange, 
what is permitted to be exchanged, on what terms does exchange take place, 
and what remedies are available for breach.  There are socio-­economic and 
racial dimensions to exchange relationships.  Moreover, in exchange theory, 
we understand that choice is always preceded by belief, and therefore it is 
important to study the fixation of belief from the perspective of cultural-­
interpretation theory.  Exchange takes place in a social context and involves 
complex dynamics unable to be fully captured in the economics of the self-­
interested pursuit of wealth maximization. 
3
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market, I focus my analysis on an evaluation of the underlying 
real estate transaction and the related activities of the primary 
mortgage market.  I do this because of time and space 
limitations and because I believe we need to have a sound 
regulatory approach to the underlying real estate transaction if 
we want to ultimately have improved financial regulation of 
the secondary market, as well as of the market for mortgage 
related securities. 
In developing this argument I proceed in several steps.  
First, I discuss the fallacy of self-­correcting markets as a way of 
explaining the need for volitional and purposeful regulation in 
the housing and mortgage markets.  Second, I provide an 
overview of the basic exchange relationships among the parties 
involved in the underlying real estate transaction, those in the 
primary and secondary mortgage market, and potential 
investors in mortgage related securities.  And third, I suggest a 
series of regulatory reforms for improving the soundness of the 
underlying real estate transaction and the operation of the 
primary mortgage markets.  These reforms include measures 
that fall into three thematic categories: taking steps to reduce 
speculation in housing prices;; eliminating incentives for over-­
borrowing and over-­lending;; and adjusting the structure of the 
underlying real estate transaction to undermine the incentive 
for degraded transactions and the tendency toward an inverse 
SULVRQHU·VGLOHPPDSUREOHP5 
 
II. The Fallacy of Self-­Correcting Markets 
 
Markets are not objects that can be observed and studied 
as something real.  Markets are dynamic and involve the 
complex human activity of exchange.  Markets, much like legal 
systems, can be informal or formal.  Most modern markets of 
major significance, however, tend to be formal and are the 
institutional product of human action.  In particular, housing 
and mortgage markets are formal institutional frameworks 
that rely on legal infrastructure to facilitate long distance and 
impersonal exchange networks of trade and exchange.  Distant 
  
5. See, e.g., MALLOY, MARKET CONTEXT, supra note 4, at 130-­32.  See 
generally, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners· Dilemma: 
Coordination, Game Theory, and Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 209 (2009). 
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investors, lenders, buyers and sellers all rely on a belief in the 
soundness of housing and mortgage market institutions in 
order to facilitate a complex set of exchanges. 
Economists often talk about markets as if they are real 
objects and as if people simply find themselves placed in 
naturally existing market environments in which they respond 
to stimuli by taking self-­interested actions to maximize their 
own wealth.  This idea of the market as a real place is, 
however, a metaphor, as are the many models that economists 
generate and use to describe markets.6  7KHHFRQRPLVWV·LGHa of 
the market is a representation or model of the underlying 
networks and patterns of human exchange;; it is not itself the 
real to which it refers, just as a map of a given city or of the 
world is not the real to which it makes reference.7  Such maps 
and models are always partial and incomplete even though 
they may serve to convey important information with respect to 
certain characteristics or qualities of the real that they 
represent.8  These models are constructed within the 
assumptions of economics which function as a kind of math-­
based sociology in an effort to describe the process of human 
exchange. 
In explaining their models of market behavior, economists 
often speak in terms of markets as being ´self-­correcting.µ  
When one speaks in terms of self-­correcting markets one offers 
DQLWHUDWLRQRQ$GDP6PLWK·V invisible hand metaphor.9  This 
means that markets are suggested to be real, physical places 
capable of automatically adjusting to continuously changing 
circumstances, and doing so in a way that simultaneously 
maximizes efficiency and wealth for individuals and the public 
alike.10  According to some, all of this happens as if the market 
  
6. See MALLOY, MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 4;; DEIRDRE N. MCCLOSKEY, 
IF YOU·RE SO SMART: THE NARRATIVE OF ECONOMIC EXPERTISE (1990);; DEIRDRE 
N. MCCLOSKEY, THE RHETORIC OF ECONOMICS (2d ed. 1998). 
7. See MALLOY, MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 4;; MALLOY, MARKET 
CONTEXT, supra note 4. 
8. See MALLOY, MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 4;; MALLOY, MARKET 
CONTEXT, supra note 4. 
9. See supra note 2. 
10. See MALLOY, MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 4, at 4, 88, 127, 138, 150 
(noting that efficiency is a complex and ambiguous concept as any 
distribution can be efficient, and no optimal course of action can be 
determined in a complex system);; MALLOY, MARKET CONTEXT, supra note 4, at 
5
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were being directed by an invisible hand.  The upshot of this, 
however, is a belief that such a model renders unnecessary 
most, if not all, government regulation of the market.  If 
markets are real, natural, and continuously self-­balancing, 
there is little for government to do.  This belief, however, 
ignores the fact that formal markets are the institutional 
products of volitional human action, and these institutions both 
constrain and incentivize particular networks and patterns of 
exchange;; they privilege particular types of transactions and 
approaches to transactions, even if they do not dictate a given 
individual exchange. 
Economists also speak in terms of self-­correcting prices but 
this is a matter quite different from the assertion of self-­
correcting markets.  Price is simply an interpretation of value 
and any given set of prices reflect value differences among and 
between available items within a given institutional market 
framework.11  As relative value changes within a given system, 
prices adjust to signal the relative changes.  The process of 
signally relative changes in underlying values within a given 
system is different than saying that the institutional product of 
human action itself is self-­correcting.12 
In part, the current crisis in the U.S. housing and 
mortgage market results from a misunderstanding of markets 
on the part of government policy makers and regulators.13  
  
27-­30 (noting that 6PLWK·V LQYLVLEOH KDQG WKHRU\ LV RIWHQ SUHVHQWHG DV DQ
invariance argument in support of a claim that private parties pursuing their 
own self-­interest end up promoting, in an equivalent fashion, the public 
interest.  There is, however, variance between private interest and public 
interest ² meaning that there are inequalities between marginal public costs 
and benefits, as well as marginal private costs and benefits.). 
11. Price, as an interpretation of value, is a well-­accepted concept in 
semiotics;; as an interpretation of value, it is relational with respect to other 
available options.  See MALLOY, MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 4, at 18-­20, 30-­
32, 45-­46. 
12. A major element of a sound market exchange process is that prices 
are permitted to equilibrate freely so that relative values can be signaled to 
participants in exchange.  This permits a good flow of information regarding 
the prioritization of system-­based incentive structures. 
13. See Edmund L. Andrews, Greenspan Concedes Flaws in Deregulatory 
Approach, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2008, at B1;; Rick Brooks, The United States of 
Subprime;; Data Shows Bad Loans Permeate the Nation, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 
2007, at A1;; Phil Gramm, Deregulation and the Financial Panic, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 20, 2009, at A17;; Kara Scannell, Greenspan Admits Errors to Panel, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 2008, at A15;; John B. Taylor, How Government Created 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/15
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Under the Bush administration, singing in harmony with the 
Chicago School law and economics types, markets were 
understood as self-­correcting and capable of coordinating 
complex exchanges with little or no need for government 
interference or oversight.  Market analysis is presented as a 
rational and self-­interested calculus of choice designed to 
promote efficiency and the maximization of wealth.14  The 
problem with the Chicago School approach is that it fails to 
understand the distinction between economics and markets, 
and more particularly, the economic analysis of law and the 
idea of law in a market context.15  Economics is an academic 
discipline grounded around certain assumptions and principles 
that define its mode of inquiry from that of other social sciences 
and forms of thinking.16  Like other fields of academic inquiry 
that approach law and policy, economics helps one to organize 
interesting questions and uncover valuable insights.  Also like 
other fields of social inquiry it is not fully determinate and is 
limited in its ability to represent the real world of exchange to 
which it refers.  Moreover, while it is important to consider law 
in its market context, this is quite different from suggesting 
that law can be optimized via an economic calculus.17 
In reality, markets are about the networks and patterns of 
exchange and not the economic calculus of choice.18  Markets 
involve communities of interaction and the establishment of 
cultural-­interpretive norms of exchange.  In markets, self-­
interest is informed by a dynamic relationship between the 
  
the Financial Crisis, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 2009, at A19.  Fixing the problem is 
also proving difficult for policy makers.  For example, early efforts at 
modifying individual home mortgages to avoid foreclosure revealed that 
´[m]ore than half of homeowners fell behind on mortgage payments in the 
first six months after their loans were modified.µ  Ruth Simon, Easing 
Mortgages ,VQ·W D 3DQDFHD ² Bank Data Show Many Homeowners Falling 
Behind Soon After Loans are Modified, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 2008, at A4. 
14. See MALLOY, MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 4;; MALLOY, MARKET 
CONTEXT, supra note 4. 
15. See MALLOY, MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 4;; MALLOY, MARKET 
CONTEXT, supra note 4. 
16. See MALLOY, MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 4;; MALLOY, MARKET 
CONTEXT, supra note 4. 
17. See MALLOY, MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 4;; MALLOY, MARKET 
CONTEXT, supra note 4. 
18. See MALLOY, MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 4;; MALLOY, MARKET 
CONTEXT, supra note 4. 
7
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individual and the community, and price is understood as an 
interpretation of value and not value itself.19  In looking at law 
in a market context, we understand the significance of market 
dynamics and economic insights, and at the same time, 
recognize that there is no way to identify an optimal legal rule 
or course of action, that efficiency is an ambiguous concept that 
can be easily manipulated, and that wealth maximization 
simply maximizes an institutional bias in favor of those who 
already have wealth.20  Economics is simply a stylized way of 
representing particular aspects of the exchange process.  It is 
one way of interpreting elements of the complex human 
experience of exchange, and as such, it is always and 
everywhere partial and incomplete in its ability to represent 
that to which it makes reference.21  Nonetheless, policy makers 
and government officials invoke economic models as rhetorical 
devices to promote amoral and strategic game-­like behavior 
wherein the accumulation of wealth is celebrated as the 
highest claim to success, achievement, and social worth.  The 
ultimate display of the failure of the Chicago School approach 
to treating law as the object of economic calculus is the collapse 
of the housing and mortgage markets.22 
Markets are not self correcting in economic terms.  In 
economic terms, markets have to be defined, rights assigned, 
allocation rules established, and other institutional structures 
put in place.  With a given approach to trade and exchange, 
people can interact in accordance with the established rules of 
the game and prices will adjust in a price system to reflect 
relative values among competing goods and resources.  Prices 
in this system are self-­correcting precisely because they are 
simply markers or signs of relative relationships between 
values in a given institutional or environmental context.  These 
institutional structures and practices stay in place as long as 
  
19. See MALLOY, MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 4;; MALLOY, MARKET 
CONTEXT, supra note 4. 
20. See MALLOY, MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 4;; MALLOY, MARKET 
CONTEXT, supra note 4. 
21. See MALLOY, MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 4;; MALLOY, MARKET 
CONTEXT, supra note 4. 
22. The size of the worldwide losses on bad loans and securitization are 
estimated to be $4.1 trillion, according to the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF).  Harry Maurer & Cristina Linblad, One Nasty Slump, BUS. WK., May 
4, 2009, at 5. 
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there is a belief in their ability to promote and deliver 
particular value-­based outcomes in a cost-­effective manner.23  
With globalization, pressing social and environmental 
problems, and dramatic disparities in access to resources, the 
American narrative of the unfettered and individual pursuit of 
wealth and greed is coming to a rapid demise;; as practiced, it is 
simply no longer credible to many people. 
Markets are built on trust, duty, prudence, loyalty, 
tradition, discipline and rules.  Markets do not function in an 
amoral context.  Markets are about people exchanging and 
interacting in community, and more and more people are 
realizing that markets are not self-­correcting.  Rather, people 
correct markets and people change the institutional structures 
and incentives.24  The misplaced belief in the idea of self-­
correcting markets allowed housing and mortgage markets to 
be exploited and degraded by actors seeking only to maximize 
their own self gain. 
Housing and mortgage markets have been and continue to 
be heavily subsidized and supported by active government 
intervention to achieve cost-­effective outcomes in housing 
policy.25  This is perhaps one of the most ironic elements of the 
claim by law and economics types that markets are self-­
correcting and natural.  Modern housing and mortgage 
markets function as clear examples of institutionally created 
and managed exchange networks, making it difficult to believe 
that the people who created these markets think that they are 
actually self-­forming and re-­forming. 
In earlier days, people typically either bought property for 
cash, as part of a service for ownership arrangement, or on 
credit terms of a short duration such as five years.26  This kept 
RZQHUVKLS UDWHV UHODWLYHO\ ORZ E\ WRGD\·V VWDQGDUGV27  In an 
  
23. The focus on belief is important as a precursor to choice in the 
semiotics of Charles S. Peirce and his theory of abductive logic.  See 
BROMLEY, supra note 1, at 19, 88-­151;; MALLOY, MARKET CONTEXT, supra note 
4, at 93-­104. 
24. See BROMLEY, supra note 1, at 1-­19. 
25. See generally AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND PUBLIC-­PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIPS (Nestor M. Davidson & Robin Paul Malloy, eds., 2009). 
26. See generally Robin Paul Malloy, The Secondary Mortgage Market: A 
Catalyst for Change in Real Estate Transactions, 39 SW. L.J. 991 (1986). 
27. At the time of World War II homeownership rates in the United 
States were at about 43.6%;; as of 2004 they were at about 70%.  ROBIN PAUL 
9
88 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  30:79 
effort to purposefully advance access to ownership and increase 
ownership rates, the government created special lending 
institutions, mortgage forms, and lending regulations.28  After 
World War II, government-­sponsored activities expanded.  
Using the Federal Housing Administration, Veterans 
Administration, and other loan devices, along with efforts by 
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae, the government 
intervened to create a much expanded credit market in support 
of residential home ownership.29  These interventions provided 
low-­cost mortgage loans, extended the length of credit 
repayment terms, and provided mortgage insurance that was 
particularly important to borrowers in need of low down 
payments.30  By the year 1980, the government had created an 
even more expansive market for housing credit with its 
development of the secondary mortgage market.31  This new 
market further extended affordable credit for home ownership, 
and offered greater liquidity and risk reduction for primary 
mortgage market lenders.  Primary market lenders could then 
enjoy a ready market for the sale of the mortgage loans that 
they originated.  Furthermore, the amount of loanable funds 
increased dramatically as mortgage-­related securities were 
sold through general capital markets to investors who had 
previously not purchased market instruments from real estate 
related intermediaries²or at least not instruments that 
pushed money back into further loan originations and 
additional real estate transactions. 
Government involvement was critical for the development 
of the secondary mortgage market for several reasons.  First, 
developing a fully functioning and national market for 
  
MALLOY & JAMES CHARLES SMITH, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 313-­14 (3d ed. 
2007).  In more recent years, the U.S. homeownership rates have generally 
been in the mid-­to-­high 60% rate, with the time period between 1994 and 
2004 showing significant increases in the diversity of the home-­owning 
population.  Id. 
28. See id. at 379-­83;; ROBIN PAUL MALLOY & JAMES CHARLES SMITH, REAL 
ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 725-­50 (1st ed. 1998);; GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. 
WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 916-­1011 (5th ed. 2007). 
29. See generally Malloy, supra note 26;; NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 
28. 
30. See generally Malloy, supra note 26;; NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 
28. 
31. See MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 27, at 379-­83;; MALLOY & SMITH, 
supra note 28, at 725-­50;; NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 28, at 916-­1011. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/15
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individual home mortgages that originated in banks from coast 
to coast raised tremendous coordination problems.  Second, 
state law involving property, mortgages, and foreclosure varied 
among the States, raising huge transaction costs for 
coordinating information, documentation, and the pooling of 
mortgages.32  Third, the technology for tracking the details, 
monthly payments, and other requirements of millions of 
discrete home mortgages was extremely difficult to organize 
without major investments in integrated technology systems 
and protocols that could only reasonably result from federal 
involvement.  And fourth, it is unlikely that many private 
investors would have invested in the mortgage-­related 
securities without an understanding that they were to have 
indirect, if not direct, government backing.33  This not only 
reduced investment risk generally, but it also made the 
mortgage backed securities more competitive with private 
securities by reducing the discount that would otherwise have 
been applied to these offerings.34 
With the secondary market, the government created and 
sponsored the institutional framework for transforming 
mortgages into securities capable of attracting resources from 
the general capital markets.  The history of housing and 
mortgage markets in the United States is one of continuous 
and purposeful adjustment and readjustment of institutionally 
incentivized exchange relationships, and not one of self-­
emerging and self-­correcting markets.35 
  
32. See generally DAVID S. HILL & CAROL BROWN, BASIC MORTGAGE LAW 
(2007);; MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 27;; MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 28;; 
Malloy, supra note 26;; NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 28;; Gant S. Nelson & 
Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure: The Uniform Non-­Judicial 
Foreclosure Act, 53 DUKE L.J. 1399 (2004). 
33. See generally Richard Scott Carnell, Handling the Failure of a 
Government-­Sponsored Enterprise, 80 WASH. L. REV. 565 (2005);; David Reiss, 
7KH )HGHUDO *RYHUQPHQW·V ,PSOLHG *XDUDQWHH RI )DQQLH 0DH DQG )UHGGLH
0DF·V 2EOLJDWLRQV 8QFOH 6DPWill Pick Up the Tab, 42 GA. L. REV. 1019 
(2008). 
34. Joseph Shenker & Anthony J. Colletta, Asset Securitization: 
Evolution, Current Issues and New Frontiers, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1369, 1383 
(1991). 
35. For a discussion of federal taxation subsidies, see generally Chad D. 
Emerson, All Sprawled Out: How the Federal Regulatory System Has Driven 
Unsustainable Growth, 75 TENN. L. REV. 411, 423 (2008);; M.H. Hoeflich & 
John E. Thies, Rethinking American Housing Policy: Defederalizing 
Subsidized Housing, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 629 (1987);; and Roberta F. Mann, 
11
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This background helps put into context an October 24, 
2008, report in the Wall Street Journal by economist and 
former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, declaring 
KLV ´VKRFNHGGLVEHOLHIµWKDW ILQDQFLDO LQVWLWXWLRQVKDGIDLOHGWR
protect themselves from risk tied to mortgage securities.36  It 
was a statement of shock that has been much ridiculed as one 
of not understanding that self-­interested people often do not in 
fact end up promoting the public interest and for continuing to 
believe that markets are continuously self-­correcting as if lead 
by an invisible hand with no need for regulation or appropriate 
oversight. 
In my mind, *UHHQVSDQ·VVKRFNHGGLVEHOLHIHFKRes a classic 
line from the film Casablanca when Claude Rains, as Captain 
5HQDXOWLVRUGHUHGE\WKH*HUPDQVWRVKXWGRZQ5LFN·V&DIé.37  
5HQDXOW TXLSV WKDW KH KDV QR OHJDO UHDVRQ WR FORVH 5LFN·V WR
  
The (Not So) Little House on the Prairie: The Hidden Costs of the Home 
Mortgage Interest Deduction, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1347 (2000).  For a discussion 
on the history of FHA and VA loans, see Adam Gordon, The Creation of 
Homeownership: How New Deal Changes in Banking Regulation 
Simultaneously Made Homeownership Accessible to Whites and Out of Reach 
for Blacks, 115 YALE L.J. 186, 194-­96 (2005);; and Florence Wagman Roisman, 
National Ingratitude: The Egregious DeficiHQFLHV RI WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV·
+RXVLQJ 3URJUDPV IRU 9HWHUDQV DQG WKH ´3XEOLF 6FDQGDOµ RI 9HWHUDQV·
Homelessness, 38 IND. L. REV. 103, 112-­46 (2005).  See also generally Quintin 
Johnstone, Private Mortgage Insurance, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 783 (2004).  
For a discussion on the gRYHUQPHQW·V UROH LQ WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI WKH
secondary mortgage market, see Julia Patterson Forrester, Mortgaging the 
$PHULFDQ 'UHDP $ &ULWLFDO (YDOXDWLRQ RI WKH )HGHUDO *RYHUQPHQW·V
Promotion of Home Equity Financing, 69 TUL. L. REV. 373, 394-­97 (1994);; and 
Cathy Lesser Mansfield, 7KH5RDGWR6XESULPH´+HOµWas Paved With Good 
Congressional Intentions: Usury Deregulation and the Subprime Home Equity 
Market, 51 S.C. L. REV. 473, 476 (2000).  )RUDGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHJRYHUQPHQW·V
role in the creation of uniform lending documents, see Christopher L. 
Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2185, 2226-­27 
(2007);; and see generally Arthur W. Leibold, Jr., Uniform Conventional 
Mortgage Documents: FHLMC Style, 7 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 435 (1972).  
For a history of the gRYHUQPHQW·V UROH LQ FUHDWLQJ)DQQLH0DHDQG)UHGGLH
Mac, see generally Carnell, supra note 33;; Reiss, supra note 33. 
36. Scannell, supra note 13 (noting that the Federal  Reserve Chairman, 
Alan Greenspan, GHFODUHG KLV ´VKRFNHG GLVEHOLHIµ WKDW ILQDQFLDO LQVWLWXWLRQV
had failed to protect themselves from risks tied to mortgage securities, and 
that ´*UHHQVSDQ VDLG KH PDGH ¶a mistake· in his hands-­off regulatory 
philosophy, which many now blame in part for sparking the global economic 
troubles. . . . He conceded that he has ¶found a flaw· in his ideology and said 
he was ¶distressed by that.·µ). 
37. CASABLANCA (Warner Brothers 1943).  See also HOWARD KOCH, 
CASABLANCA: SCRIPT AND LEGEND 176-­77 (1992). 
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ZKLFKWKH*HUPDQVFRPPDQG´ILQGRQHµ38  In manufacturing 
an excuse to legally close the Café, Captain Renault walks 
toward the casino, collects his gambling payout for the night, 
and simultaneously declares to Rick (played by Humphrey 
Bogart) that the Café must be closed immediately, as he is 
´VKRFNHG VKRFNHG WR ILQGJDPEOLQJ LV JRLQJRQ LQKHUHµ39  Of 
FRXUVH &ODXGH 5DLQV·s lines were delivered for amusement 
ZKHUHDV *UHHQVSDQ·V VKRFNHG GLsbelief reveals something 
tragic in the regulatory ideology of the United States.  For 
Greenspan to be in shocked disbelief demonstrates either an 
ideological commitment to certain assumptions that are so deep 
that they blinded his perception of the reality going on around 
him, or a level of disingenuous rhetoric that is in its own way 
as lacking in credibility as the declaration of Captain Renault 
in Casablanca. 
The bottom line is that markets are not, and should not be, 
self-­correcting.  The fallacy of self-­correcting markets and the 
false rhetoric of the neoclassical law and economics types is one 
of promoting the idea of the market as a desirable end in itself.  
Markets are not an end, they are a means;; specifically, they are 
a means for arranging exchange networks in ways that permit 
individuals and communities to cost effectively pursue 
volitional goals and objectives that they believe are 
normatively, ethically and aesthetically desirable.40  Markets 
are shaped by public policy and need regulation and oversight 
to continuously confirm their cost-­effective ability to assist in 
the achievement of the desired ends.  Real estate markets are 
no exception. 
 
III. A Real Estate Transactions Perspective  
on Mortgage Markets 
 
Real estate transactions involve the capturing and creating 
RIYDOXHIURPH[FKDQJH,VRPHWLPHVUHIHUWRWKLVDV´SURSHUW\
in action.µ  7KURXJK WUDGH DQG H[FKDQJH RSSRUWXQLWLHV IRU
capturing and creating value emerge and these opportunities 
  
38. CASABLANCA, supra note 37.  See also KOCH, supra note 37, at 176-­77.   
39. CASABLANCA, supra note 37.  See also KOCH, supra note 37, at 176-­77.   
40. See generally MALLOY, MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 4, at 106-­40;; 
BROMLEY, supra note 1. 
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incentivize further trades and exchanges.  These underlying 
transactions occur at the primary market level and form the 
ground and foundation for secondary market activities such as 
those in the secondary mortgage market. 
This part of the article addresses the exchange 
relationships among key participants in the primary market, 
the secondary market, and the third party investors in 
mortgage related securities.  It finishes with a brief discussion 
on the regulatory importance of dealing with the underlying 
real estate transaction as fundamental to any effort to reform 
the secondary market and its securities based operations. 
 
A.   The Primary Market 
 
At the core of every transaction in mortgaged backed 
securities is an underlying transaction in real estate.  Thus, we 
need to understand the nature and quality of the underlying 
transaction if we hope to get a handle on the current crisis in 
financial markets. 
In a basic home sale transaction we have three 
transactional perspectives to consider.41  The primary parties 
to a purchase and sale agreement are the buyer and the seller 
of the property.  The secondary parties to this transaction are 
those who are engaged in administrative and managerial 
transactions related to the basic purchase and sale agreement.  
These parties may typically include: brokers, attorneys, a title 
company, an insurance company, a surveyor, and a loan 
originator for the mortgage loan.  The transcendent third 
parties are not directly involved in the deal but have a 
potential future interest in the underlying transaction.  These 
include people meant to be protected by the maintenance of the 
public records and potential investors further down the 
transactional chain, or potential future buyers and creditors.42 
The basic exchange relationship of a real estate 
transaction is illustrated in Diagram I, below. 
 
 
  
41. See generally MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 27 (discussing basic 
coverage of the various aspects of law important to real estate transactions). 
42. See id. at 231-­68 (discussing the public records). 
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DIAGRAM I.  REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS AND THE  
PRIMARY MORTGAGE MARKET 
 
The basic real estate transaction is illustrated in Diagram 
I.  Seller conveys the agreed upon interest in property to the 
buyer for a benefit.43  A typical transaction involves a money 
payment in exchange for delivery of a deed.  Frequently the 
buyer does not pay the full purchase price out of her own 
resources.  Instead the transaction is leveraged as the buyer 
finances a large portion of the expense.44  This is shown on the 
left-­vertical side of the diagram.  In a standard home loan, the 
lender of the funds secures the repayment of the loan with a 
promissory note and a mortgage.  This provides a conditional 
claim to the property in the event that the buyer/borrower does 
not live up to the terms of the promise to repay. 
This set of exchange relationships can be very much 
localized in the absence of a secondary market for mortgages.45  
In such a case, the lender would make the loan and hold it in 
its investment loan portfolio.46  The lender would need to 
  
43. See id. at 1-­180 (discussing basic contract considerations). 
44. See id. at 367-­510 (discussing basic mortgage considerations). 
45. See MALLOY, MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 4, at 50-­57 (discussing 
how the secondary mortgage market transformed the local home financing 
system). 
46. See generally MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 27;; MALLOY & SMITH, 
supra note 28. 
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maintain a positive spread between its cost of funds and the 
return on its investments.47  In the event that risky loans are 
made, it would impact on the financial stability of the lender 
and any losses would be borne by that institution. 
The relationships in this exchange situation establish a 
congruence of interest between borrower and lender, at least to 
the extent that each wants the underlying deal and its 
documentation to be correct, enforceable, and consistent with 
their risk and investment expectations.  As to sellers, once they 
get their cash they often have little interest in what happens 
next, unless they have some serious continuing liability under 
the terms of the conveyance.  Such a continuing liability is 
likely to arise under the instrument of conveyance, and 
typically not on the contract, because of the doctrine of 
merger.48 
In securing financing for the purchase of the property, 
buyer enters the primary mortgage market.  Diagram II, below, 
illustrates the basic exchange relationships in the primary 
mortgage market. 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
DIAGRAM  II.    THE  PRIMARY  MORTGAGE  MARKET49  
  
47. See generally MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 27;; MALLOY & SMITH, 
supra note 28. 
48. See MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 27, at 145-­52 (discussing the 
doctrine of merger). 
49. MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 27, at 380 (used with permission).  For 
background on primary markets, see also Raymond H. Brescia, Capital in 
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In Diagram II, we see the primary transaction as it 
appears when a primary mortgage market is established to 
interface with other financial networks.  In this diagram we see 
that savers and borrowers have options in the marketplace.  
There are multiple sources for lending and multiple places to 
LQYHVWRQH·VVDYLQJV)LQDQFLDOLQWHUPHGLDULHVIXQFWLRQWREULQJ
savers and borrowers together and make a profit by keeping a 
positive spread between their cost of funds and the return on 
their investments.  In real estate transactions we have 
intermediaries that deal in mortgages;; they compete for 
savers/investors against other types of investments available in 
the broader capital markets, such as the market for corporate 
stocks and bonds.  The lenders that make the loans to the 
parties in the underlying real estate transaction are the 
originators of the primary mortgages.  They often use in-­house 
or external mortgage brokers who work for fees and 
commissions to originate the mortgages.  Primary lenders 
should basically provide confirmation as to certain aspects of 
the underlying real estate transaction by verifying such things 
as the title and property appraisal value in relation to the 
contract, mortgage, and price terms.  This verification process 
should be based on underwriting standards meant to reduce 
the risk of default. 
 
B.   The Secondary Market 
 
The secondary mortgage market creates opportunities for 
primary lenders to sell the mortgages that they originate.50  
This enhances liquidity, reduces risk by diversifying the 
primaU\ OHQGHU·V LQYHVWPHQW SRUWIROLR DQG LQFUHDVHV WKH
  
Chaos: The Subprime Mortgage Crisis and the Social Capital Response, 56 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 271, 285 (2008);; Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A 
Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. 
L. REV. 1255, 1278-­79 (2002);; and Aaron Unterman, Exporting Risk: Global 
Implications of the Securitization of U.S. Housing Debt, 4 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 
77, 79-­80 (2008).  See also generally Peterson, supra note 35, at 2199;; Ronald 
K. Schuster, Lending Discrimination: Is the Secondary Market Helping to 
0DNHWKH´$PHULFDQ'UHDPµD5HDOLW\", 36 GONZ. L. REV. 153, 155-­57 (2000-­
2001). 
50. See generally MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 27;; MALLOY & SMITH, 
supra note 28;; NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 28;; Malloy, supra note 26;; 
supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
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available funds for lending by recharging the assets of the 
primary lender.51  There are both public-­ and private-­related 
entities functioning as secondary mortgage market 
intermediaries.  They buy and sell loans and loan 
participations, as well as package loans into pools for 
securitization.  They issue various mortgage related securities 
and bonds, and sell them into the financial markets.52  
Diagram III, below, illustrates the basic exchange relationships 
of the secondary mortgage market. 
The secondary mortgage market not only creates a market 
for primary mortgages, but it also changes the underlying 
relationships in the primary market.  Prior to the secondary 
market·V emergence around 1980, the primary lenders 
originated and held their loans.53  This gave them a vested 
interest in the quality of the loans and in maintaining good 
relations with their customers.  With the rise of the secondary 
market, primary lenders were able to sell the mortgages at par 
(face value and without a discount)54 to recharge their assets, 
and this provided the opportunity to make money from fees for 
generating new mortgages rather than from simply originating 
and holding loans as an investment.  In this new situation, 
lenders shifted their focus to providing services and products 
welcomed by the secondary market intermediaries.55  The local 
homebuyer seeking a loan became much less significant to 
banking operations as money was to be made in churning the 
paper of loan originations rather than by cultivating 
relationships based on long-­term lend and hold investment 
  
51. See generally MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 27;; MALLOY & SMITH, 
supra note 28;; NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 28;; Malloy, supra note 26;; 
supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
52. For additional background on issues related to the secondary 
mortgage market and securitization, see generally Kenneth C. Kettering, 
Securitization and its Discontents: The Dynamics of Financial Product 
Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553 (2008);; and David Reiss, Subprime 
Standardization: How Rating Agencies Allow Predatory Lending to Flourish 
in the Secondary Mortgage Market, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 985 (2006). 
53. See generally Malloy, supra note 26. 
54. One way this is done is by using points that can be passed on to the 
borrower as closing costs, with the points covering the amount that otherwise 
would be discounted against face value.  See MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 27, 
at 383-­84. 
55. See MALLOY, MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 4, at 50-­57.  See generally 
Malloy, supra note 26. 
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strategies.56  Transactions became more uniform, standardized, 
and driven by a desire for fee and servicing income based on 
relatively quick sales of mortgages to the secondary market 
intermediaries.57 
The secondary market also created an exchange 
environment that influenced behavior in the primary market, 
beyond that of switching from a loan and hold, to a fund and 
sell operation.  Primary lenders began to adjust their 
underwriting standards and their risk tolerance based on the 
willingness of secondary market intermediaries to take non-­
conforming and subprime loans.58  As long as there was a 
market for what they originated, the primary lenders could 
simply collect their fees and sell the loan off to recharge their 
asset-­base and make more fee income.  The underlying 
economic goal of this behavior was QRW WR OLPLW RQH·V VHOI WR
some personal or idealized standard of loan quality, but to 
maximize profit based on what one can sell in the relevant 
secondary market.  The underwriting standards of the 
secondary market intermediaries (the entities purchasing loans 
from originators in the primary market) changed over time, 
making it easier to fund more borrowers for home mortgages.  
As the secondary market underwriting standards were made 
easier, primary market originators adjusted their activities to 
reflect tolerance for greater risk. 
 
 
  
56. See MALLOY, MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 4, at 50-­57.  See generally 
Malloy, supra note 26. 
57. See MALLOY, MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 4, at 50-­57.  See generally 
Malloy, supra note 26. 
58. For a discussion on these lowered lending standards, see generally 
Brescia, supra note 49, at 295;; Benjamin Howell, Exploiting Race and Space: 
Concentrated Subprime Lending as Housing Discrimination, 94 CAL. L. REV. 
101, 124-­27 (2006);; and Rayth T. Myers, Foreclosing on the Subprime Loan 
Crisis: Why Current Regulations are Flawed and What is Needed to Stop 
Another Crisis From Occurring, 87 OR. L. REV. 311, 313-­16 (2008).  Lower 
standards also included use of negative amortization loans, and piggy back 
financing, ZKHUHDOHQGHUZRXOGIXQGWKHERUURZHU·VHTXLW\UHTXLUHPHQW
with a second mortgage so that the borrower really had no equity in the 
property.  MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 27, at 383-­99. 
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DIAGRAM III.  THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET59 
  
59. MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 27, at 382 (used with permission). 
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C.   Third Party Investors 
 
Third party investors purchase securities issued against 
the anticipated and expected value of the cash flow on the 
underlying mortgages associated with a given issue.  The 
underlying cash flow supports the value of the security but the 
investor does not typically become an owner of the mortgage 
loans themselves.  On the other hand, some investors purchase 
loan participations that give them direct rights to cash flow of a 
given underlying mortgage or mortgages.  In either situation, 
early payoffs from refinancing can impact the expected value of 
the cash flow, as can defaults and foreclosures.  Thus, accurate 
pricing and valuation depend on the quality of the underlying 
transactions;; and, more particularly, on the quality, validity, 
and authenticity of the information about the underlying 
transactions.60 
Investors have little firsthand knowledge of the underlying 
documentation or of the legal rules applicable to the underlying 
transaction.  They rely on the basic uniformity of standardized 
mortgage documents, and the fact that both the primary and 
secondary intermediaries approved the loans.  This reliance 
factor is enhanced by the presence of two very dominant 
entities with implicit, although not express, backing of the 
United States Government: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  In 
fact, it is known that the Federal Government encouraged loan 
originations based on new and lower underwriting standards.61  
  
60. Much of what we do in a transactional law practice involves what I 
KDYH FDOOHG ´WUDQVDFWLRQDO DXWKHQWLFDWLRQµ  7KLV PHDQV ZH VSHQG WLPH
confirming the authenticity of the buyer, seller, the documents, the property, 
the reality of the mortgage, and the credit behind it, etc.  These transactions 
are in paper, or else take place as representations of the property and the 
debt, and we must confirm that the representations are of something that is 
real.  For instance, the presence of a paper deed does not verify the existence 
of the actual property to which the deed refers.  As to pricing, there are a 
number of issues, including calculation of the expected life of the mortgage as 
opposed to its term.  A typical residential mortgage will be for a stated term 
of thirty years but in reality, the life will be very much shorter.  This occurs 
for several reasons, including a sale of the home, a refinance, or a default.  
The typical American moves about every five years, for instance.  See Robin 
Paul Malloy, Inclusion by Design: Accessible Housing and Mobility 
Impairment, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 699, 726-­28 (2009) (discussing housing 
demographics). 
61. See Russell Roberts, How Government Stoked the Mania, WALL ST. 
J., Oct. 3, 2008, at A21.  Congress pushed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to 
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This was part of a volitional policy of enhancing home 
ownership rates across more income ranges and all racial 
categories by making it easier for more and more people to get 
into a home. 
In addition to encouraging greater flexibility and ease of 
loan approval, the leadership of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
earned incentive pay and bonuses based on hitting and 
exceeding targeted goals in loan originations made to people 
who would not likely qualify under the standards for 
traditional conventional mortgages.62  In this way the 
organizations that many Americans mistakenly believed were 
policing the mortgage markets were in fact being incentivized 
to profit from lower standards of supervision and underwriting.  
In fact, no government entity was supervising the mortgage 
markets, given that Fannie and Freddie were not technically 
government entities, and given that they had an incentive to 
participate in bad practices rather than to actively regulate 
against them. 
In this rather odd arrangement, third party investors 
relied on the approval of the secondary market intermediaries 
as a form of confirmation as to the quality of the underlying 
loans, and at the same time the secondary market 
intermediaries relied on continuing investor interest as 
confirmation of the market for its products.  Thus, as long as 
the products were able to find a market, they were believed to 
be sound.  In theory, if these products were not believed to be 
sound, rational and self-­interested actors would not buy them.  
In the world of standard neoclassical economics, as used by 
many law and economics practitioners, this is the world of self-­
correcting markets and circular absurdity.  The circularity of 
the logic goes something like this: the securities being issued to 
  
make more and more loans to people of lower income, and many of these 
loans were in the troubled subprime mortgage markets.  Id.  ´)DQQLH DQG
Freddie played a significant role in the explosion of subprime mortgages and 
subprime mortgage-­EDFNHGVHFXULWLHVµId.  See also Ruth Simon, Mortgages 
Made in 2007 Go Bad at Rapid Clip, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2008, at A3.  
´(YLGHQFH WKDW OD[ OHQGLQJ VWDQGDUGV ZHUH OHDGLQJ WR KLJKHU PRUWJDJH
delinquencies ILUVWHPHUJHGLQODWHµ Id. 
62. See James R. Hagerty et al., After Fannie Shake-­Up, Regulators 
Focus on Pay, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 2004, at A1;; James R. Hagerty, Fannie 
Will Use New Benchmarks in Setting Incentive Pay for 2005, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 14, 2005, at A2. 
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investors were good because the investors bought them, and 
because the investors bought them, the intermediaries knew 
that the new and lower underwriting standards were sound so 
they could keep originating and selling these products. 
In the process of packaging and selling mortgaged-­based 
securities, many complicated financing devices and insurance 
arrangements obscured information for investors, but to a 
certain extent the impact of the financial complications are 
uncertain since many of the investors in these mortgage-­
UHODWHG LQVWUXPHQWV ZHUH VLPSO\ EX\LQJ HDFK RWKHU·V
obligations.  In other words, primary market originators were 
also active investors;; thus, investors were, in part, buying each 
RWKHU·VEDGORDQV63 
The government-­supported outcomes of this incentivized 
market structure were that it did increase home ownership 
rates across a diverse racial spectrum, and in addition, it added 
to the growth of the money supply.64  In buying mortgages 
through the secondary market, the government pumps money 
into the mortgage markets and recharges the asset base of 
primary mortgage lenders.  In this way more money circulates 
in the economy permitting a sense of economic growth.  This is 
an indirect way to mask a government stimulus package that 
drives economic activity in the wake of rising deficits and bad 
economic fundamentals due to huge expenditures allocated to 
the War on Terror, rising oil prices, and unfavorable trade 
balances.  This method of expanding the money supply, via real 
estate related financial intermediaries, helped fuel continuing 
demand and thus speculation in housing markets. 
  
63. See Paul Beckett & John Hechinger, ´Subprimeµ Could Be Bad News 
for Banks ² Riskier Loans, Now Prevalent in Industry, Show Problems, WALL 
ST. J., Aug. 9, 2001, at C1;; Carrick Mollenkamp, Faulty Assumptions: In 
Home-­Lending Push, Banks Misjudged Risk ² HSBC Borrowers Fall Behind 
on Payments, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 2007, at A1. 
64. See MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 27, at 313-­14 (increasing diversity 
of home ownership);; Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law and 
Economics of Subprime Lending, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 21-­23 (2009).  See 
also Miriam Jordon, Housing Boom Aided Minorities, WALL ST. J., May 13, 
2009, at A3.  During the recent housing boom, minority home ownership 
rates increased at a faster rate than that for whites.  Id.  The gains added a 
lot to the diversity of ownership, but since the bust, homeownership rates 
have fallen much more steeply for minorities than for whites.  Id.  This is in 
part due to the fact that minority borrowers were much more likely to have a 
subprime mortgage than whites.  Id. 
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D.  The Importance of the Underlying Real Estate Transaction 
 
It is important to focus on the underlying real estate 
transaction in the primary market when considering the future 
of secondary mortgage market activity.  The quality and 
reliability of the underlying transaction is directly linked to the 
value of the mortgaged-­based securities in the secondary 
mortgage market, and thus regulatory reform is required in 
both markets.  One market deals with the property itself, as 
represented in the deed and other closing documents, and the 
other market deals in the representations of the underlying 
transaction.  An ability to create documentary representations 
of property and then to deal in both the property and its 
representations adds economic potential to the market.65 
For example, by creating deeds, mortgages, and title 
records we permit property owners to convey an interest in 
land that can be recorded and used as collateral for borrowing 
money.  Here, the deed is a paper representation of rights of 
ownership in the property and the mortgage represents a 
contingent claim of a creditor to proceed against the property, 
  
65. See MALLOY, MARKET CONTEXT, supra note 4, at 10, 82-­84, 108-­09;; 
HERNANDO DESOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN 
THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000). 
 
In the West, . . . every parcel of land, every building, every 
piece of equipment, or store of inventories is represented in 
a property document that is the visible sign of a vast hidden 
process that connects all these assets to the rest of the 
economy.  Thanks to this representational process, assets 
can lead an invisible, parallel life alongside their material 
existence.  They can be used as collateral for credit.  The 
single most important source of funds for new businesses in 
WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV LV D PRUWJDJH RQ WKH HQWUHSUHQHXU·V
house.  These asseWVFDQDOVRSURYLGHD OLQNWRWKHRZQHU·V
credit history, an accountable address for collection of debts 
and taxes, the basis for the creation of reliable and 
universal public utilities, and a foundation for the creation 
of securities (like mortgage-­backed bonds) that can then be 
rediscounted and sold in secondary markets.  By this 
process the West injects life into assets and makes them 
generate capital. 
 
DESOTO, supra, at 6. 
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as represented by the deed, in the event of nonpayment on the 
GHEWRUSURSHUW\ RZQHU·V SURPLVH WR UHSD\ WKH ORDQ  The 
mortgage simultaneously, when coupled with a promissory 
note, represents rights to cash flow in terms of the principle 
and interest to be paid back on the loan.  All of these 
documents can be recorded in the public records so that the 
market for exchange expands to include people who are distant 
from the parties to the underlying transaction.  With verifiable 
public records, distant creditors and potential future buyers 
can extend funds to people with the appropriate documentation 
of ownership without having personal knowledge of the 
property or the parties involved.66  Moreover, an entirely new 
set of transactions can be developed with respect to 
representations in the form of mortgaged-­backed securities.  
These securities represent rights in the cash flow generated by 
the underlying mortgages, which are themselves supported by 
the underlying documentation that represents an ownership 
claim to the property to which they make reference.  
Consequently, one observes a market in the land and market 
activity in the primary and secondary representations of the 
land.  The secondary mortgage market is essentially a market 
in the representations of the representations of the value of the 
underlying land transaction. 
It is important to recognize that the market activity in the 
documents is a derivative or induced market with respect to 
the underlying transactions in the land itself.67  Thus, the 
documentary or induced transactions are not living in some 
binary and parallel universe with respect to the underlying 
transaction;; these transactions are connected. 
Two significant errors may arise from not appreciating the 
deep connection between the underlying real estate transaction 
and the market for mortgage-­backed securities.  First, one may 
erroneously assume that the market for mortgage-­backed 
securities is independent of the underlying real estate 
transaction.  This may then lead one to believe that the 
underlying transactions and the secondary market exchanges 
  
66. See DESOTO, supra note 65, at 6. 
67. See MALLOY, MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 4, at 83-­85.  See also 
ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, THE MEANING OF MARKET PROCESS 42 (1992). 
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live parallel lives.68  As a consequence, attention is focused on 
the securities market with little interest in looking back at the 
fundamentals of the underlying mortgage markets, and this is 
problematic because the quality of the underlying real estate 
transaction establishes the real value of the securities that are 
themselves representations of the underlying exchange.  In 
short, people dealing with mortgage-­backed securities may 
come to believe that property, itself, does not matter. 
The second error occurs in thinking that the market values 
of the induced transactions (those transactions in the 
secondary market) are the same as those equilibrium values 
predetermined by the relevant values of the underlying real 
estate transactions.69  In other words, the first error is 
compounded by believing that the value of the induced 
transaction is basically the same as the value of the underlying 
transaction such that one only needs to know the price of the 
mortgaged-­back security to assume the value of the underlying 
real estate transaction.  This is incorrect because the value of 
the underlying real estate transaction expresses a degree of 
freedom with respect to the price of the induced transaction, or 
stated differently, the value of the induced transaction is not 
fully determined by or covariant with the underlying 
transaction.70  Consequently, buying and selling mortgage-­
related securities at a good price and high profit does not mean 
that the underlying real estate transactions are of similar good 
value, nor even that they are economically sound.  In other 
words, the underlying real estate transaction should, but may 
not, reflect the requisite value attributable to it by the 
secondary market.  Again, more attention needs to be paid to 
the quality and value of the underlying real estate transactions 
because they substantiate the expected market value of the 
induced transactions in the secondary mortgage market. 
A third problem with current mortgage market approaches 
involves the devaluing and displacement of human judgment 
  
68. See DESOTO, supra note 65, at 6 (´assets can lead an invisible, 
parallel life DORQJVLGHWKHPDWHULDOH[LVWHQFHµ (emphasis added). 
69. See MALLOY, MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 4, at 83-­85.  See also 
ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, THE MEANING OF MARKET PROCESS 42 (1992). 
70. See MALLOY, MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 4, at 83-­85.  See also 
ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, THE MEANING OF MARKET PROCESS 42 (1992). 
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and accountability in the loan origination process.71  Human 
judgment has been replaced by mathematical models and 
standardized credit scores.  While there are concerns about the 
potential for bias and unfair discrimination when using human 
judgment, this should not mean that every decision must turn 
on a mathematical calculation and the appearance of scientific 
objectivity.72  The exercise of reasonable human judgment can 
facilitate the origination of potentially higher quality loans.  
Active involvement by lawyers, financial experts, and other 
advisors can also raise the qualitative aspects of the lending 
decision and its documentation.  This is especially true when 
participants are held accountable for the quality of their advice 
and for the decisions that they make. 
Currently, the underlying real estate transactions are 
dominated by sales people with inadequate knowledge of the 
law of property and real estate transactions.73  Transactions 
are done on uniform documents that offer the pretence of 
FRPSOHWHQHVVDQGDUHZULWWHQLQ´VLPSOH(QJOLVK.µ This masks 
the fact that the legal consequences of the words in the 
documents are not apparent to the typical reader, even though 
the reader thinks the meaning is clear.74  Since everything is 
on a pre-­written form, there is little room for professional legal 
judgment on behalf of the client.  And even though title 
examination and title insurance are supposed to be done on an 
individually reviewed basis, the practice, in spite of the 
regulation, is that everything is simply treated as a risk 
factor.75  Instead of doing the work to examine and clean-­up 
  
71. See generally Cassandra Jones Havard, Democratizing Credit: 
Examining the Structural Inequities of Subprime Lending, 56 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 233 (2006). 
72. See MALLOY, MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 4, at 53-­54. 
73. See generally Lloyd T. Wilson, Jr., Sometimes Less is More: Utility, 
Preemption, and Hermeneutical Criticisms of Proposed Federal Regulation of 
Mortgage Brokers, 59 S.C. L. REV. 61 (2007). 
74. See Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: 
The Problem of Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 762-­66 (2006). 
75. Title insurance is meant to be issued based on an actual review of 
the property and of all the property related records, with a specific conclusion 
drawn as to the status of title for the specific piece of property.  It is not 
meant to be a simple risk-­based insurance coverage.  See MALLOY & SMITH, 
supra note 27, at 269-­91;; Robin Paul Malloy & Mark Klapow, Attorney 
MalpractLFH IRU )DLOXUH WR 5HTXLUH )HH 2ZQHU·V 7LWOH ,QVXUDQFH LQ D
Residential Real Estate Transaction, 74 ST. JOHN·S L. REV. 407, 427-­28, 439-­
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title problems the way it should be done, many insurers simply 
insure the risk of a potential transaction going bad. 
In a similar way, lenders have changed the way they do 
business.  Lenders now deal with uniform documents and 
numeric credit scores, use minimal or no back-­up 
documentation, and retain little or no ownership interest in the 
loans they originate.76  These lenders no longer function as 
simple intermediaries between savers and borrowers;; they 
function as complex financial institutions offering a wide range 
of products and services.  In this lending environment, the 
residential housing market is simply a paper-­churning process 
engaged in to generate fee and service income with the vast 
majority of mortgages being sold into the secondary market.  
This new arrangement eliminates a great deal of human 
judgment with respect to the quality of the loan and the credit 
worthiness of the borrower. 
In the current (pre-­meltdown) environment of the 
secondary mortgage market, judgment and accountability have 
EHHQWUDGHGIRUWKH´HIILFLHQF\µRIKLJKYROXPHDQGWKHPDNLQJ
of risk contracts to cover losses²risk contracts that apparently 
failed to account for the low quality of the underlying real 
estate transaction. 
 
IV. Fixing the Primary Market 
 
From a primary market perspective, there are a number of 
steps that can be taken to improve the soundness of housing 
and mortgage markets as they impact secondary mortgage 
market operations.  This section of the Article addresses three 
areas in which specific steps can be taken.  These areas 
involve: taking steps to reduce speculation in housing prices;; 
  
40 (2000).  See also Robin Paul Malloy, Using Title Insurance to Avoid 
Malpractice and Protect Clients in a Changing Marketplace, 11 THE DIGEST 
51, 55 (2003) (noting that 25% of real estate transactions involve a title 
problem). 
76. See Brescia, supra note 49, at 289-­90;; Julia Patterson Forrester, 
Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform Mortgage Instruments: The Forgotten 
Benefit to Homeowners, 72 MO. L. REV. 1077, 1083-­87 (2007);; Schuster, supra 
note 49, at 155-­58;; Willis, supra note 74, at 715-­721.  See generally Peter M. 
Carrozzo, Marketing the American Mortgage: The Emergency Home Finance 
Act of 1970, Standardization and the Secondary Market Revolution, 39 REAL 
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 765 (2005). 
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reducing incentives to over-­borrow and over-­lend;; and dealing 
ZLWK DQ LQYHUVH SULVRQHU·V GLOHPPD SUREOHP E\ UH-­
professionalizing the underlying real estate transaction. 
 
A.  Curbing Housing Market Speculation 
 
When one examines the problems driving the crisis in 
mortgage markets and mortgage-­backed securities, it is 
difficult to underestimate the role of housing market 
speculation.  Speculation as to the never-­ending rise in future 
home values was the foundation for numerous investment 
missteps.77  Borrowers were convinced that they could afford 
more house than they could pay for and that they could take on 
DOO NLQGV RI GHEW LQFOXGLQJ ´WR[LF ORDQVµ ZLWK QHJDWLYH
amortization and exploding interest rates, because the future 
rise in value of the property would more than cover any present 
disparity in ability to pay.78  Lenders also let their guards 
down, feeling that future increases in housing prices would 
cover any risk not otherwise spread and passed off through the 
secondary mortgage market.79  Mortgage brokers and 
originators took advantage of the situation to put people into 
bigger loans and earn higher dollar payout commissions.80 
  
77. Speculation and market bubbles have been problems for centuries.  
See generally, e.g., Christian C. Day, Paper Conspiracies and the End of All 
Good Order: Perceptions and Speculation in Early Capital Markets, 1 
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 283 (2006). 
78. See Kirstin Downey, Non-­Traditional Loans Require Financial 
Discipline, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2006, at F10;; Kenneth R. Harney, Those 
Interest-­Only Loans May Turn Toxic for Some, CHI. TRIB., July 4, 2004, at 2. 
79. See generally Georgette C. Poindexter, Subordinated Rolling Equity: 
Analyzing Real Estate Loan Default in the Era of Securitization, 50 EMORY 
L.J. 519 (2001). 
80. For example, a borrower might qualify for a $300,000 conventional 
mortgage yet be strongly encouraged to apply for a $500,000 subprime loan.  
The idea or sales pitch behind this is that the buyer will get ownership of a 
higher valued property with the larger loan and gain from greater leverage 
and control of a more valuable asset.  If one assumes (as a speculator) that 
market prices for the property will rise at a fast rate, then more is to be 
gained by using more leverage, and the rapidly rising equity will more than 
cover getting the buyer out from the burden of a subprime loan with profit on 
a sale or a refinance in relatively short order.  Of course, the key here is that 
prices have to keep rising as fast as or faster than assumed.  In any event, 
the loan originator pockets a higher commission based on the percent applied 
to the larger loan.  After closing the deal the failure of any expectations as to 
future prices falls on the borrower, not the loan originator. 
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In evaluating the role of speculation and overly optimistic 
speculation of future housing prices, I start from the view that 
the basic residential housing policy in America is about 
securing a reasonable opportunity for homeownership for as 
realistically large a percentage of the population as possible.  
In stating this I recognize two things.  First, not everyone in 
America will be able to enjoy the same type of housing 
ownership because fee ownership of single family housing is 
expensive.  This means that we have to simultaneously work 
harder to create more varieties of home ownership and 
improved leasehold tenure.  And second, it also means that the 
implicit goal of the American housing policy is and has been 
about home ownership and not property speculation. 
One of the underlying problems leading up to the 
meltdown in home mortgage markets has been due to the 
inherent tension of inconsistent government policies;; one policy 
seeks to make housing affordable and accessible with a vast 
network of direct and indirect government support systems, 
while the other facilitates speculation and get-­rich-­quick 
schemes from the very same housing products.81  These two 
goals are inherently inconsistent.  Residential housing is 
supported by a vast array of public funding because we want 
people to have an ownership interest in the places where they 
live, not because we want to make them venture capitalists.  
Supporting homeownership with public dollars requires a 
stable program whereas promoting homeownership as a 
primary source of wealth accumulation fosters speculation and 
risk. 
A key step that can be taken to reduce speculation and 
undermine the incentive to flip properties is one of eliminating 
gains from equity appreciation in the early years of home 
ownership.82  This can be done by taxing away the realization 
of equity appreciation gains from a sale during a stated time 
  
81. For a discussion of federal housing policy, see Emerson, supra note 
35, at 421-­30;; and Forrester, supra note 35, at 393-­419. 
82. 2QH SUREOHP LV ´IOLSSLQJ,µ ZKHUH D KRXVH LV SXUFKDVHG DQG WKHQ
resold in a very short period of time in order to gain from speculation or from 
pumping up an appraisal.  One way to reduce the incentive for this kind of 
speculative activity is to put a significant tax on the realization of equity 
appreciation when and if the property is sold within a designated period.  No 
tax is due in the absence of a triggering event, such as a sale or refinance, 
within the regulated time period. 
30http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/15
2009] MORTGAGE MARKET REFORM 109 
period.  In order to make the equity appreciation tax more 
viable from a constitutional perspective it should probably be a 
step down tax so that the tax rate decreases at the end of each 
year of ownership.  Thus, one might tax any equity 
appreciation for the first five years of ownership with step 
down rates like: 95% in year 1;; 80% in year 2;; 70% in year 3;; 
45% in year 4;; 20% in year 5;; and 0% thereafter.  Vermont is a 
state with such a program in place to reduce speculation, and 
challenges to it have been unsuccessful, as the state·V courts 
have held that the law is constitutional and supported by a 
rational public purpose.83  The main point here, however, is not 
to endorse any particular approach, such as the Vermont tax, 
but rather to develop some kind of a tax that reduces 
speculation. 
The main justification for this is that the public, through 
indirect government subsidy of the credit and mortgage 
markets, subsidizes residential housing;; it is thus fair and 
reasonable for government to manage equity speculation.  This 
management would be focused on the early years of home 
ownership and any limitations on gain would be offset by the 
potential for greater stability and predictability in the longer-­
run mortgage markets.  This kind of equity accumulation 
constraint is nothing more than what we often demand of low-­
income buyers who rely on a variety of direct subsidy programs 
to acquire so-­called affordable homeownership.84  There is no 
  
83. See generally, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32 §§10001-­10007 (2009);; 
Andrews v. Lathrop, 315 A.2d. 860 (Vt. 1974);; Karl E. Case, Taxes and 
Speculative Behavior in Land and Real Estate Markets, in 4 REV. URB. & 
REGIONAL DEV. STUD. 226 (pt. 2) (July 1992);; Thomas L. Daniels et al., The 
Vermont Land Gains Tax: Experience With It Provides a Useful Lesson in the 
Design of Modern Land Policy, 45 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 441 (1986);; Dennis 
Robinson & Elizabeth M. Chant, Interaction of Land Policy and Land-­Based 
Tax Policy: The Vermont Land Gains Tax, in 4 REV. URB. & REGIONAL STUD. 
147 (pt. 2) (July 1992);; A Special Report on Vermont Real Estate Taxes, VT. 
PROP. OWNERS REP. (Vermont Real Estate Today, Montpelier, VT.) (Supp.), 
Sept. 2006. 
84. Here, I simply point out that we already have housing programs that 
FRQVWUDLQRUUHVWULFWRQH·VFODLPWRIXWXUHHTXLW\DSSUHFLDWLRQ*LYHQWKLVLW
should not be considered alien to suggest that such constraints or restrictions 
apply to other and broader categories of residential housing.  For an example 
of the kind of general restriction on housing equity that I am referring to, see 
generally AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND PUBLIC-­PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS, supra 
note 25;; JOHN EMMEUS DAVIS, NAT·L HOUS. INST., SHARED EQUITY HOME 
OWNERSHIP: THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF RE-­SALE RESTRICTED, OWNER-­
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apparent reason to treat low-­income borrowers receiving direct 
subsidies any different than higher-­income debtors privileged 
by indirect subsidies. 
Such an equity appreciation tax would be similar in its 
goal to that of a Tobin tax.85  Each attempts to reduce short-­
term speculation while retaining long-­term benefits of 
exchange.  The Tobin tax deals with speculation in cross 
country currency trades, whereas the equity appreciation tax 
seeks to reduce the incentive for quick and speculative trades 
in housing markets.86  There would be no incentive for housing 
flips (often done within a short-­time of the original transaction) 
if there is no immediate equity gain to be realized.  This not 
only cools down speculation and a major rationale for over-­
borrowing and over-­lending, but it also undermines one of the 
biggest elements of fraud in the housing market. 
Importantly, such a tax does not take away or diminish the 
value of the property;; the tax only goes to equity appreciation 
over the stated period of time, and it is triggered only by an 
event such as a resale within the stated time period.  If a buyer 
paid a fair market price, he should be able to get that back 
even if he sells during the first five years.  The main point is 
that we should encourage home ownership and stability in 
communities while undermining the incentives for speculation 
and fraud in housing and mortgage markets. 
Other steps could be taken to supplement this anti-­
speculation idea.  These can include elimination of the tax 
benefits for interest deductions on home mortgages, or to at 
  
OCCUPIED HOUSING (2006);; EMILY THANDEN, VANDERBILT UNIV. CMTY. 
RESEARCH & ACTION PROGRAM, SHARED EQUITY HOMEOWNERSHIP: SHARING THE 
COSTS & BENEFITS (2008), available at http://www.thda.org/govsummit/ 
presentations/Shared%20Equity%20Homeownership%20Sharing%20the%20
Costs%20Benefits.pdf;; and Thomas J. Miceli et al., The Role of Limited-­
Equity Cooperatives in Providing Affordable Housing, 5 HOUSING POL·Y 
DEBATE 469 (1994). 
85. For a quick explanation of the Tobin tax, which taxes away quick 
gains on currency speculation, see TOBIN TAX INITIATIVE, FACT SHEET ON 
TOBIN TAXES, http://www.ceedweb.org/iirp/factsheet.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 
2009).  See also generally Thomas I. Palley, Speculation and Tobin Taxes: 
Why Sand in the Wheels Can Increase Economic Efficiency, 69 J. Econ. 113 
(1999) (Austria).  
86. See TOBIN TAX INITIATIVE, supra note 85.  See also generally Palley, 
supra note 85.  
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least suspend it for the first several years of ownership.87  The 
deduction is not needed as we can observe similar 
homeownership rates in countries such as Canada where there 
is no special tax benefit for mortgage interest payments.88  The 
actual result of the mortgage interest deduction is that it 
encourages wealthier Americans to buy bigger homes than 
needed in order to get a tax shelter.  This is bad in itself since 
it encourages over use of resources and promotes bigger and 
increasingly more negative impacts on the environment than 
would otherwise be demanded by housing consumers. 
 
B.   Reducing the Incentive to Over-­Borrow and Over-­Lend 
 
There are a number of steps that might be taken to reduce 
the incentives for bad loans in the primary market.  In this 
section of the Article, I consider two areas where effective 
action can be taken.  These areas deal with the commission 
structure for loan origination and the transferring of 
accountability in the selling of loans to the secondary market. 
In the primary market, buyers of property frequently need 
or opt for mortgage financing.  In seeking a mortgage, they 
generally deal with an originating mortgage broker or with a 
loan officer at a lending institution.  These loan originators 
typically work on some combination of salary and commission 
with commission incentives weighing heavily as the key 
incentive for compensation.  Working for points as a percentage 
of the loan amount, the loan originators have an incentive to 
qualify borrowers and to push them into larger loans.89  For 
example, if the originator earns 2% on each new loan 
origination, she can double her return by getting a borrower to 
take a more risky loan of $300,000 rather than a $150,000 loan 
  
87. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., HOME MORTGAGE INTEREST 
DEDUCTION, PUBLICATION 936 (2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-­
pdf/p936.pdf. 
88. Homeownership rates are similar in the United States and Canada, 
even though Canada does not allow a tax break for mortgage interest 
deductions and it requires a 20% down payment, or else mortgage insurance 
must be acquired.  See Marie-­Josee Kravis, 5HJXODWLRQ'LGQ·W6DYH&DQDGD·V
Banks, WALL ST. J., MAY 7, 2009, at A17;; Mann, supra note 35, at 1385-­86;; 
CAN. MORTGAGE & HOUS. CORP., HOMEOWNERSHIP MARKET, http://www.cmhc-­
schl.gc.ca/en/corp/about/cahoob/data/data_003.cfm (last visited Oct. 16, 2009). 
89. See generally Brescia, supra note 49;; Havard, supra note 71. 
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that is more readily affordable.  This accounts in part for the 
fact that some 35% of subprime loans went to people who could 
have purchased a home on a mortgage they could afford but 
instead opted for a much larger loan on subprime terms. 
This push for moving borrowers to loans with larger dollar 
amounts is also incentivized by the fact that it cost about the 
same amount in terms of time and paperwork to process a 
small loan as it does a larger loan.  Therefore, to produce 
favorable economies of scale, effort is expended toward 
originating large loans rather than small ones, again 
incentivizing the pushing of borrowers into riskier debt 
positions.  One way to reduce this perverse incentive structure 
is to eliminate commissions on loan origination.  Since the 
work and time required on all of these home loans is similar, 
all originations should be done on a flat fee basis²perhaps a 
few hundred dollars per loan without regard to the loan 
amount.90 
A related problem arises from the tax code and the way it 
incentivizes over-­borrowing by rewarding debtors for taking on 
larger loans to produce higher tax benefits.91  The incentive 
structure works to encourage the purchase of larger and more 
expensive homes.  The irony, of course, is that to the extent 
that housing markets are efficient, the future tax benefit will 
be discounted and built into the present value pricing of the 
home.  This means that housing is more expensive than it 
otherwise would be since home buyers have to pay now for the 
future stream of tax benefits, and this arrangement favors the 
middle and upper class while making initial homeownership 
that much more difficult for people with lower incomes.  It is a 
straight-­out subsidy for the middle and upper classes with 
little evidence that it substantially helps expand home 
ownership rates, in spite of the assertions of real estate 
salespeople. 
A second area of concern involves lender accountability.  
Here I have two key suggestions.  Each suggestion goes to the 
matter of keeping loan originating institutions accountable for 
  
90. See MALLOY, MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 4, at 53-­55. 
91. See supra notes 87-­88 and accompanying text.  The IRS mortgage 
interest tax deduction is an incentive to borrow more in order to get a higher 
offsetting deduction from a bigger loan. 
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the loans that they originate.  One suggestion deals with 
recourse liability on the loans that are sold to the secondary 
market, and the second deals with the elimination of the 
deficiency judgment in the event of a default and foreclosure 
against a borrower with little or no equity in the transaction.92 
A problem fostered by the secondary mortgage market is 
the reduction in accountability of primary lenders when they 
sell mortgages to the secondary market.  The lack of a 
continuing ownership interest and direct responsibility for loan 
risk reduces long-­term accountability for making bad lending 
decisions.  When lenders hold the mortgages they originate, 
they have a stronger interest in making sure the loans are well 
supported in the first instance.  One way to bring back greater 
accountability is to require lenders to retain an ownership 
interest in their loans even after they are sold, or to make all 
such loan sales recourse.  Making all such sales recourse would 
be different from requiring the lender to keep an ownership 
interest but it would still add to accountability because all bad 
loans and debt would remain a contingent liability of the 
originating lender. 
Related to this approach is to eliminate DOHQGHU·VULJKWWR
a deficiency judgment against a defaulting borrower.93  
Currently most state laws dealing with foreclosure permit a 
lender to sue a defaulting borrower for any deficiency between 
the amount owed on the mortgage loan and the amount that 
the property brings in at a foreclosure sale.94  One way to make 
the lender more cautious about the quality of the loan in the 
first instance is to eliminate the right to seek a deficiency 
judgment in the event of default and foreclosure.  This would 
make the lender look entirely to the land for recovery of the 
  
92. See, e.g., Lawrence D. Jones, Deficiency Judgments and the Exercise 
of the Default Option in Home Mortgage Loans, 36 J. L. & ECON. 115, 135 
(1993);; Todd J. Sywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law and Economics of 
Subprime Lending, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 30-­35, 41-­45 (2009).  See also 
MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 27, at 447-­77 (discussing foreclosure).  See 
generally John Mixon, Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Home Mortgage Documents 
Interpreted as Nonrecourse Debt (with Poetic Comments Lifted from Carl 
Sandburg), 45 CAL. W. L. REV. 35 (2008). 
93. See MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 27, at 447-­77 (discussing 
foreclosure).  See generally NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 28 (same). 
94. See MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 27, at 447-­77 (discussing 
foreclosure).  See generally NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 28 (same). 
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debt in the event of default.  Therefore, lenders would have 
increased incentives to get fair and honest appraisals of the 
properties when making loan decisions. 
This limitation on deficiency judgments could be 
structured in one of two ways: it could be an across-­the-­board 
elimination of this remedy, or it could be applied to particular 
loan standards.  As to particular loan standards, it might be 
that a rule would state that the right to a deficiency judgment 
is limited to loans in which the borrower had at least a 20% 
equity interest in the property at the time of the mortgage.  
7KLVZRXOG LQFOXGH WKH HOLPLQDWLRQRI ´SLJJ\ EDFNµPRUWJDJHV
where lenders ´pretendµ that a borrower has 20% equity by 
making two simultaneous loans;; one for 80% as a first 
mortgage and one for 20% as a second loan.95  This two-­step 
process has been used to get around the need for private 
mortgage insurance (PMI) by papering a file to look like there 
is 20% equity when in fact 100% of the property value is 
mortgaged.96 
 Similarly, deficiency judgments could be eliminated in 
situations where a lender chose to use a high risk or complex 
mortgage loan form, such as one with negative amortization, 
open-­ended (no cap) adjustable interest rates, or one based on 
so-­called low documentation.  Another alternative would be to 
simply exclude such loans from the secondary market and 
require originating lenders to hold them in their own loan 
portfolios. 
 
C.  $GGUHVVLQJDQ,QYHUVH3ULVRQHU·V'LOHPPD3UREOHPLQthe 
 Underlying Real Estate Transaction 
 
Correcting the secondary mortgage market requires that 
we also attend to problems manifesting themselves in the 
  
95. See Sywicki & Adamson, supra note 92, at 41-­43;; Edmund L. 
Andrews, Most Homeowners Not Overly in Debt, Fed Chief Says, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 27, 2005, at C1. 
96. See MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 27, at 399 (discussing piggyback 
mortgages).  See also Simon, supra note 61 (stating that ´[t]he share of 
borrowers with prime jumbo loans who took out a ¶piggyback· second 
mortgage ² which allowed borrowers to finance more than 80% of their 
KRPH·VYDOXHZLWKRXWSULYDWHPRUWJDJHLQVXUDQFH ² climbed to a record 33% 
LQµ). 
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primary market, at the intersection of the underlying real 
estate transaction and the loan origination process.  One source 
of problems here is related to what I think of as an inverse 
SULVRQHU·V GLOHPPD SUREOHP  ,Q WKH VWDQGDUG SULVRQHU·V
dilemma we confront a situation in which transacting parties 
confront various transaction costs which drive them to take 
non-­cooperative positions resulting in inefficiencies, and these 
inefficiencies generate less than optimal social benefits.97  In 
WKH VWDQGDUG DQDO\VLV RI WKH SULVRQHU·V GLOHPPD, efforts are 
undertaken to use law to reduce the interfering transaction 
costs so that the transacting parties will cooperate and 
negotiate to an efficient exchange relationship.  In the current 
(pre-­meltdown) environment a number of problems can be 
EHWWHUXQGHUVWRRGE\WKLQNLQJLQWHUPVRIDQLQYHUVHSULVRQHU·V
dilemma.98  To a significant degree, the problem in the primary 
mortgage market is one of cooperation rather than failure to 
cooperate.  The incentive structure of the underlying 
transaction favors cooperation in misbehavior and fraud.99  In 
papering fraudulent transactions with hyped up appraisals, 
bad surveys, and simultaneous flips, it takes more than one 
participant to succeed.100  The underlying transactions have 
  
97. See MALLOY, MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 4, at 130-­32 (discussing 
WKHSULVRQHU·VGLOHPPDSee generally McAdams, supra note 5. 
98. See MALLOY, MARKET ECONOMY, supra note 4, at 130-­32 (discussing 
WKHSULVRQHU·VGLOHPPDSee generally McAdams, supra note 5. 
99. See generally Brescia, supra note 49, at 292;; Gretchen Morgenson, 
Inside the Countrywide Lending Spree, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2007, at 3.1;; Bob 
Tedeschi, Report Piles Blame on Brokers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2008, at RE10;; 
Julie Creswell & Vikas Bajaj, A Mortgage Crisis Begins to Spiral, and the 
Causalities Mount, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2007, at C1;; Kathleen Day, Villains in 
the Mortgage Mess?  Start at Wall Street.  Keep Going, WASH. POST, June 1, 
2008, at B1. 
100. See, e.g., Michael M. Phillips, Would You Pay $103,000 for This 
Arizona Fixer-­Upper? ² 7KDW:DV0V+DOWHUPDQ·V0RUWJDJHRQ,W, WALL ST. 
J., Jan. 3, 2009, at A1.  The article chronicles the financing of a property 
valued at $15,000 for $103,000 to a woman who had been without a job for 13 
years and whose only source of income was welfare and food stamps.  Id.  For 
a fee of $350 an appraiser valued the house at $132,000 without ever looking 
at it.  Id.  The house was condemned with a notice stapled to the wall, stating 
that it was ´XQILWIRUKXPDQRFFXSDWLRQ.µ  Id.  The mortgage was originated 
by a small mortgage firm named Integrity (a firm located in Arizona), and it 
collected $6,153 in fees for the origination.  Id.  The loan was sold to Wells 
Fargo and then to the London-­based HSBC.  Id.  The mortgage was then 
bundled with 4,050 other mortgages and used as collateral for a security 
issued in July, 2007.  Id. 
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basically become degraded and corrupt, and there is a need for 
legal action to reduce the incentive to cooperate among the 
misbehaving participants. 
In this section of the Article I focus on the underlying real 
estate transaction and suggest ways to reduce the incentive to 
cooperate in degraded transactions by changing the existing 
exchange relationships. 
There are several steps to be taken to improve the quality 
of the underlying real estate transaction which is important to 
also improve the quality of the securities issued in the 
VHFRQGDU\PRUWJDJHPDUNHW 7KHVH LQFOXGH ´ULJKW ILWWLQJµ WKH
professional expertise needed to properly structure and close a 
real estate transaction, making the work and fees for services 
more transparent and providing incentives for participants in 
the underlying transaction to report misbehavior and fraud. 
In a typical real estate transaction involving residential 
housing, there are three primary elements;; one involves the 
selling of the house as a consumer good, a second involves the 
transfer and conveyance of all of the relevant property 
interests, and the third involves the legal arrangements for 
structured mortgage financing.  Two of these areas require the 
expertise and knowledge of a professional licensed attorney;; 
one requires the skill of a professional real estate salesperson. 
The process of selling a house as a consumer good is one 
that is best handled by a real estate salesperson: marketing 
issues must be attended to and knowledge of current consumer 
tastes and preferences is needed.  The salesperson develops a 
strategy for highlighting the important features of the house 
and establishes a plan for connecting potential buyers with 
hopeful sellers.  This is an important intermediary function. 
In the American housing market the problem is that real 
estate salespeople have been allowed to function in areas in 
which they are not fully qualified.  The important tasks of 
drafting a purchase and sale contract and of understanding the 
details of conveyancing and title are beyond the realm of a 
VDOHVSHUVRQ·VH[SHUWLVH101  While most salespeople believe they 
  
101. There is, after all, a reason that people go to law school and get 
licensed to understand the legal aspects of property law, foreclosure law, and 
real estate transactions.  Non-­lawyers do not fully appreciate the legal 
implications of these transactions.  Policy in this area seems to be shaped by 
a simple desire to reduce transaction costs by dramatically reducing and even 
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know property law and the law of real estate transactions, this 
belief is simply unfounded.  The skill set and knowledge of real 
estate sales has little to do with understanding the details and 
nuances of property and mortgage law.  Salespeople also step 
outside of their area of expertise in addressing the structuring 
of mortgage financing.  Some salespeople understand the 
economic implications of particular financing arrangements but 
lack knowledge of the legal and property implications of 
mortgage law, including the law of default and foreclosure, 
which must be assessed up front when advising borrowers.  
More importantly, salespeople lack the professional licensing of 
a lawyer that provides consumers with important information 
DERXW WKH LQGLYLGXDO·V Wraining and knowledge, and which 
makes the individual liable for a particular standard of care 
and conduct as governed under the law and by the Rules of 
Professional Responsibility. 
$V WR WKH LQYHUVH SULVRQHU·V GLOHPPD SUREOHP WKH UHDO
estate salesperson and the loan originator often function as 
gatekeepers for coordinating ancillary services provided by 
such parties as appraisers, surveyors, and title insurers.  Today 
many salespeople not only prepare the purchase and sales 
contract but also connect the buyer to a loan originator and the 
other ancillary service providers.  In this role as gatekeeper, 
the salesperson, like the loan originator, is driven by making a 
sale and earning a commission.  Even when good intentions are 
in play, the incentive structure works to facilitate cooperation 
in a sense that is not always positive.  Appraisers, title 
companies, and surveyors know that their business is 
contingent upon cooperation with the gatekeepers who deal in 
volume.  Being cut out of the transaction because one is 
SHUFHLYHGDVEHLQJGLIILFXOWWRZRUNZLWK WRRFDXWLRXVD´GHDO
NLOOHUµ E\ VORZLQJ XS WKH GHDO RU IRU IROORZLQJ SUDFWLFH
guidelines that cost more than the services others will provide, 
means the end of a profitable business relationship.  Many 
business players in the residential market depend on referrals 
and inclusion by the gatekeepers in order to make a living.  
Competition that is not properly policed and regulated, 
  
eliminating lawyers from a meaningful role in the exchange.  This has been 
done without careful consideration of the consequences, such as the 
continuing degradation of primary market transactions. 
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therefore, often results in an incentive to cut corners and go 
along so that everyone makes money, even if the deal is 
degraded and unsound. 
One of the key underlying problems, of course, involves 
asymmetrical information.102  The borrowers in these 
transactions have inferior information and typically less 
knowledge than the parties who are regular participants in the 
networks of primary and secondary mortgage market 
financing.  Consequently, the consumer is in no real position to 
police or even fully understand the weaknesses of the system in 
which she is operating.  This weakness is not corrected by 
government requirements for pages of disclosure information, 
which most people do not really bother to read or understand, 
especially since salespeople generally are willing to offer a 
watered down assurance of everything as being just fine.  It is 
difficult and perhaps even economically irrational for 
consumers to spend their time and effort actually overcoming 
the asymmetrical information problem such that we cannot 
rely on consumers to correct the market on their own;; public 
regulation is required.  Moreover, the idea that the buying, 
selling, and financing of property in the United States is 
dominated by salespeople with no professional qualifications in 
law is difficult to believe, and it fosters exchange relationships 
that create mutual incentives for degraded cooperation²
cooperation that, unless heavily policed and regulated, leads to 
potentially toxic externality costs for mortgage and financial 
markets. 
To a large extent the legal profession in the United States 
is at fault here for its willingness to continuously erode its 
professional duty in the area of real estate transactions.103  
Gradually the courts have granted more and more authority to 
non-­lawyers to operate in areas of property law²areas in 
which non-­lawyers are not properly trained, educated, or 
  
102. See MALLOY, MARKET CONTEXT, supra note 4, at 169-­72 (discussing 
asymmetrical information). 
103. The profession has ceded ground to non-­lawyers in the basic real 
estate transaction, and lawyers have become meaningless participants when 
used because gatekeepers have worked to keep lawyer compensation so low 
that almost no lawyer can actually afford to spend the time doing competent 
legal work on the file.  Exceptions would be when a lawyer represents a high-­
income buyer of a very expensive home, where the buyer understands the 
complexity, and is willing to pay. 
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regulated.  My recommendations here are that sales 
professionals should confine their work to sales and all contract 
drafting, title evaluation, mortgage advising and closing of real 
estate transactions must be done by licensed real estate 
lawyers.  In order to make this a reality, there must be a 
return to earlier requirements as to the definition of the 
practice of law, with strong prosecution of the unauthorized 
practice of law. 
Returning lawyers to the transaction will beneficially alter 
the exchange relationship of the transaction.  Lawyers are not 
salespeople and they have expertise in the underlying subject 
matter of the sale and the mortgage financing.  More 
importantly, they are advocates who understand the 
transactional benefits of an adversarial process.  They 
understand that some transaction costs generate positive social 
externalities.104  The attorney does not work on a commission, 
does not rely on the closing of the transaction to earn a fee, and 
is held to a professional code of conduct that reduces the 
incentive for participation in transactional misbehavior.  If all 
parties are represented by attorneys at the closing, a rare 
VLWXDWLRQ LQ WRGD\·VPDUNHWSODFH WKHUH LV OLNHO\ WR EH DPXFK
higher quality transaction and thus a higher quality basis for 
the derivative transactions in the mortgage-­backed securities 
markets.  In this context, legislation and professional 
regulations need to prohibit real estate people from engaging in 
activities that go beyond sales work, and the meaning of sales 
work should go back to earlier definitions when sales people 
were not permitted to complete contracts, fill in legal forms, or 
provide mortgage advice.  In addition, lawyers and salespeople 
should be prohibited from representing more than one party to 
a transaction and from splitting or sharing fees and 
commissions. 
Naturally, in order to effectively bring lawyers back into 
the residential transaction to perform a substantive and 
purposeful role rather than a perfunctory one, the transactions 
have to make economic sense.  It is here that we need a change 
in belief and understanding on the part of the general public.  
  
104. See David M. Driesen & Shubha Ghosh, The Functions of 
Transaction Costs: Rethinking Transaction Cost Minimization in a World of 
Friction, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 61, 109 (2005). 
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It is ridiculous for salespeople to be collecting $7,000, $10,000, 
or more, in commissions at a closing while buyers, sellers, and 
lenders cringe at the thought of paying a lawyer $200.  The 
public has been fooled into thinking that salespeople can do the 
job of a lawyer and that there is nothing to be gained from 
compensating a lawyer for active participation in the full scope 
of the exchange.  Lawyers need to get back to playing a central 
role in these transactions and they have to make a living wage 
from doing this work if it is to have any substantive value. 
Admittedly not every lawyer is an expert in real estate just 
because he or she has a law degree.  Therefore, law schools and 
the Bar should develop a specialized area of practice in real 
estate conveyancing, with a special certification and 
requirements for annual education updates.  These specialized 
lawyers would handle all residential real estate transactions 
and be subject to certification and periodic evaluation and 
review.  They would need to be well-­qualified in such subjects 
as contract, property, and mortgage law, including foreclosure, 
and appropriate federal housing regulations.  In addition, they 
would need to know title examination, title insurance, 
condominium and common property ownership law, negotiable 
instruments, electronic fund transfers, secured transactions, 
local land use and zoning law, implications for bankruptcy, and 
they would need to have basic knowledge of surveys and 
appraisals.  Only certified conveyancing lawyers would be 
allowed to handle residential transactions involving funds 
drawn on, and mortgages funded by federally chartered or 
insured institutions, or any institution that sells mortgage-­
related instruments into the secondary markets.  States could, 
of course, further regulate this practice with respect to funds 
drawn from, or mortgages made by, state institutions and with 
private funding.  Commercial real estate transactions would be 
excluded from these specific regulations for the time being.105 
In terms of compensation, lawyers and salespeople should 
each charge for services on an hourly basis and prepare a 
detailed statement supporting the bill.  This would provide 
more information and make the process more transparent.  
  
105. The concerns in a commercial real estate transaction are different.  
In these transactions, lawyers are still significant participants and the clients 
are typically much better informed than those in the residential home 
market.  There is also less of a problem with asymmetrical information. 
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Percentage commissions make no sense because they often 
bear no relationship to the work performed, provide no detailed 
billing information as to service performed, and encourage 
pushing buyers into bigger and more expensive homes and 
mortgages.  Percentage billing on real estate sales commissions 
simply facilitates the kind of problems we see elsewhere in the 
primary market for real estate transactions and finance. 
In addition, there should be an incentive structure to 
encourage participants in a transaction to report misbehavior 
and fraud to the proper law enforcement authorities.  For 
example, a person reporting the use of hyped appraisals or 
questionable and simultaneous flips might be rewarded with 
triple the amount of the closing costs plus attorney fees and 
costs.  This, or something like it, would help break the 
degraded cooperation that has undermined the soundness of 
the mortgage markets.  We might also require that residential 
housing loans be funded by specially charted and registered 
financial institutions doing nothing but residential mortgages. 
Making these changes may increase the cost of closing a 
given transaction, but then it may save much more than it 
costs by dramatically improving market outcomes.  In other 
words, increased costs on the individual underlying 
transactions can nonetheless generate positive externalities for 
society that far exceed the costs.106  Avoiding the hundreds of 
billions of dollars in catastrophic losses that we are now 
experiencing would be worth slight increases in the cost of 
performing the underlying transactions.107  There are a number 
of values and factors to consider in comparing overall costs and 
benefits at the individual micro level and the broader macro 
level.  People just need to face up to the fact that there are 
expenses and transaction costs that accompany buying and 
owning a home.  These include paying reasonable attorney fees 
and confronting a given set of transaction costs that lead to 
positive social benefits for the entire system. 
If we are worried about rising transaction costs and we 
want to assist people in buying a first home, we should avoid 
subsidizing them in ways that push them into economically 
  
106. See Driesen & Ghosh, supra note 104, at 109. 
107. Worldwide losses on bad loans and securitization are estimated to 
be $4.1 trillion.  See Maurer & Linblad, supra note 22. 
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unsound mortgage relationships and that unnecessarily 
degrade the mortgage market.  It is better to get them into 
mortgages where they can afford the monthly payments and 
subsidize them in terms of the closing cost of getting into a first 
home.  There can be multiple ways of doing this and here I 
suggest one way.  We can establish a program that provides 
qualifying first-­time home buyers with an earned income credit 
for closing costs directly related to professional services up to 
$5,000.108  This earned income credit would apply to 
professional services billed on an hourly rate with an itemized 
receipt and could include attorney fees, real estate sales and 
broker fees (if the service is fully billed on an itemized hourly 
basis without commission and then coverable up to $1,500), 
title examination, and survey fees.  Eligible buyers would be 
first-­time home buyers earning up to 110% of the median 
income in the standard metropolitan statistical area in which 
the home is located.  A program such as this would assist 
people with the difficult task of saving enough money to cover 
the closing costs, and thus make it easier to move from renting 
to ownership while still focusing on sound fundamentals in 
evaluating the willingness and ability to pay the debt service 
on the actual mortgage.109 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
The current financial crisis is a complex one with many 
causes.  Many of the problems observed in the secondary 
mortgage market can be traced back to weaknesses in the 
underlying real estate transaction and the exchange 
relationships in the primary market.  Therefore, as we think 
about the future of financial regulation and mortgage markets 
we must look carefully at the underlying exchange.  The 
  
108. An earned income tax credit provides a direct benefit to the 
taxpayer in the amount earned.  The amount can be determined based on a 
number of factors;; I suggest $5,000 as a reasonable starting point to offset 
closing costs for the first-­time homebuyer, to the extent that these costs 
might increase by returning lawyers back to a role of substantive 
participation in the underlying real estate transaction.  The suggested dollar 
amount is not the critical point;; rather, it is the idea of using this kind of 
mechanism to assist people with the cost of getting into their first home. 
109. See MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 27, at 368. 
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quality of the primary market transaction drives the potential 
results that we can expect in the secondary market.  With low 
quality going into the system, we will certainly get low quality 
coming out.  Thus, planning for the future of financial 
regulation must include planning for the underlying real estate 
transaction. 
As suggested in this Article, there are several steps that 
can and should be taken to improve the quality of the primary 
market in real estate transactions.  First and foremost, we 
must come to realize the fallacy of the asserted ideology of self-­
correcting markets.  Instead of waiting for under-­regulated 
markets to correct themselves, we must develop volitional and 
purposeful regulation of housing and mortgage markets.  We 
also need to take steps to curb speculation in housing prices, 
reduce incentives for over-­borrowing and over-­lending, and 
restructure the underlying exchange relationships to avoid the 
SUREOHPVRIDQLQYHUVHSULVRQHU·VGLOHPPD7DNLQJVXFKVWHSV
may cause a rise in the closing expenses in the underlying real 
estate transaction but overall social benefits will increase as 
more certainty and stability govern the markets and as fewer 
incentives exist to promote people to over-­borrow or to 
participate in fraud. 
The fact is that buying and owning a home are expensive.  
Not everyone can afford the same type of home ownership.  We 
need to fix the broken parts of our current market and we need 
to develop more and better types of housing opportunities that 
provide a sense of ownership and the benefits that go with it.  
Simply trying to put people into homes that they cannot afford 
does no one any good.   
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